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The IHRA de nition’s imprecision
makes it a threat to free speech
The de nition is vague and has no legal standing—
leaving it open to misuse by those who wish to sti e
speech. Long after the Labour debate is over, this
problem will remain
by Rebecca Gould / September 7, 2018 / Leave a comment
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In a legal opinion on the IHRA de nition of antisemitism
that has received much exposure in recent months,
Geo rey Robertson QC notes that the law must be
“formulated with su cient precision to enable citizens to
regulate their conduct.” Like many proposals to curtail free
speech—including in the name of
 ghting misogyny and Islamophobia—the IHRA de nition of
antisemitism fails this crucial test of legal legitimacy.
Adam Wagner, a prominent proponent of the IHRA
de nition who has o ered valuable commentary on the
controversies surrounding antisemitism in the Labour
Party, has questioned Robertson’s view that the IHRA
de nition has no “legal e ect.” “A tribunal,” he suggests,
“would be at the least interested in the de nition.”
If by this Wagner means simply th t a tribunal would be
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If by this Wagner means simply that a tribunal would be
open to an argument that it should consult the IHRA
de nition as it might consult any non-legally binding text
when the parties so choose, then his view is consistent with
Robertson’s.
Robertson’s point, however, is that the UK government’s
unconventional “adoption” of the de nition does not render
it legally binding in the sense that primary and subordinate
legislation, judicial precedents, local authority bye-laws, and
organisational rules are binding on those subject to the
relevant body’s jurisdiction. This slippage, from Robertson’s
intended meaning of “legal e ect” to Wagner’s, itself tells us
a great deal about the interpretive challenges this de nition
will pose every time it is deployed.
Adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance
Association in 2016, the IHRA de nition is among the least
precise legal options available for identifying and
addressing antisemitism. (Other de nitions have been
o ered by Brian Klug, the Holocaust Memorial Museum, the
Anti-Defamation League, and Yad Vashem.)
Unfortunately, contemporary liberal democracies appear to
have lost sight of the dangers of using such imprecise
de nitions to apply legal sanctions to speech. Along with
other measures to sanction and regulate speech, the
deployment of the IHRA de nition within the contemporary
UK is opening up a new chapter in the history of British
jurisprudence and in the politics of de ning racism.
***
The IHRA document is a two-part text, comprising a two-
sentence de nition and eleven examples that were initially
considered ancillary to the de nition. As David Feldman has
pointed out in his critical discussion of the de nition, 7 of
the 11 examples of antisemitism focus on the ways in which
criticism of Israel may be antisemitic.
Although it is this aspect that has received by far the bulk of
media attention, the de nition’s focus on anti-Israel
discourse, or what is sometimes called “left antisemitism,” is
far from its only problem. Even a staunch Zionist ought to
oppose the use of this de nition to forms of expression not
associated with hate crimes due to its troubling implications
for the rule of law.
Indeed, the original author of the de nition, Kenneth Stern,
a self-avowed Zionist and Director of Antisemitism and Hate
Studies for the American Jewish Community for a quarter
century, has taken precisely that position, of principled
opposition, not to the de nition as such but to its
increasingly frequent use to silence Israel-critical discourse
in the public domain.
An American lawyer who specializes in the First
Amendment, Stern did not foresee how the de nition
would be deployed in countries that permit governments to
censor citizens’ speech on the basis of their political points
of view. As his vocal opposition to recent uses of the
de nition within the UK attests, the risk posed by the IHRA
is greater in European countries that lack the First
Amendment protections that bar the government from
censoring speech.
When the de nition that formed the basis of t e IHRA’s was
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When the de nition that formed the basis of the IHRA’s was
drafted by Stern under the auspices of the European
Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, its purpose
was to assist the police in classifying data relating to hate
crimes. Gradually the de nition’s remit became ever wider,
moving from the classi cation of hate crimes to the
censorship of speech. In December 2016, it was adopted by
the UK government.
As Robertson notes, the de nition “was never debated in
Parliament and perhaps not even discussed in Cabinet: it
was announced by the Prime Minister at a Conservative
Party luncheon, and has no legal e ect.”
Yet as I have argued, the absence of legitimate legal e ect
from the de nition has not prevented it from being
interpreted as a law—as seen by the cancellation of an
event about Israel by the University of Central Lancashire in
February 2017.
The relationship between de nition and examples in the
IHRA document remains a particular object of contestation.
The public record shows that the IHRA never agreed to have
the examples treated as part of the full de nition—contrary
to what some UK commentators have suggested. Yet the
confused relationship between de nition and examples is
only the beginning of the problem with the de nition’s
loose legality.
Equally problematic is a lack of clarity concerning what this
“working de nition of antisemitism” actually is in legal
terms, what its “adoption” means, how it is supposed to
function in universities and other public institutions, and
with what kinds of authority.
***
The law is an instrument of coercion (as well as potentially
of liberation). It is used to punish, by taking away property,
liberty—sometimes even life. Due to its unlimited capacity
to invade our lives, to control our actions, and to in uence
our thoughts, it requires both su cient precision and a
presumption of equality.
When the law abdicates its commitment to equality (and
there is no plausible construction of the IHRA de nition that
could sustain any claim to its consistency with legal
equality), the more vulnerable those on the wrong side of
the law are to oppression. This may explain why minority
groups across the BAME community have been outspoken
in their opposition to the de nition, as have
Palestinians globally and within Israel.
Equally, minority groups within the Jewish community have
vocally expressed their opposition. Yet, most proponents of
the IHRA sidestep these objections by relying on a crude
majoritarianism that in itself is a threat to minority rights.
While Robertson and Tomlinson are correct to insist on the
non-legality of the de nition, the correctness of their
argument will not adequately protect the free speech rights
of Palestinians and other critics of Israel. Although
Tomlinson notes that conduct deemed to be in violation of
the IHRA De nition “could not, of itself, render that conduct
‘illegal’ in any sense”—and the IHRA document advises that
the examples should be applied “taking into account the
overall co text”—this crucial nuance will inevitably be lost
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overall context”—this crucial nuance will inevitably be lost
when the de nition is implemented by human resource
administrators, managers, and others tasked with
implementing equality and diversity initiatives who lack
training in the law and will bring their own interpretive
contexts to its implementation.
Given the expense of judicial review and the three-month
time limit imposed on potential cases, those who  nd their
free speech rights violated by the IHRA de nition—or by
any speech code—are rarely able to obtain legal redress.
***
The IHRA de nition exacerbates the di culty of protecting
controversial speech by authorizing dangerous violations of
due process due to its loose legality. Before advocating laws
that propose to diminish racism, we must consider the
often impossible task of their just implementation.
As a society still coming to terms with the deep roots of
antisemitism, we have spent so much time debating the
content of the IHRA de nition that we have neglected to
consider the implications of censorship for democracy.
It is not so much its controversial content that is the
problem as the way in which anyone who has observed the
cancellation of events and the silencing of UK academics
writing about Palestine since the adoption, knows it is likely
to be used.
When the row concerning Labour’s relationship to the
de nition disappears from the headlines, bigger questions
will remain. Universities will face calls for the expulsion of
academics, for the disciplining of students, and for the
cancellation of controversial events.
It is curious that, when faced with the challenges this
de nition poses to free expression, the IHRA’s most
prominent defenders mildly defend it as a mere tool that
allows criticism of Israel, while remaining silent concerning
its abuses.
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